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ABSTRACT
The airline industry plays an important role in the global economy but faces financial challenges. 
Numerous firms have filed for bankruptcy protection or have liquidated completely, each instance 
having a devastating effect on the company’s stakeholders. The objective of this study is to compare 
a traditional bankruptcy prediction model with a proposed alternative model, with the goal of iden-
tifying a means of predicting the combinations of characteristics that are present when an airline is 
likely to fail. The alternate model proved to be more accurate than the traditional model in predict-
ing bankruptcy, providing improved forecasting up to four years prior to the bankruptcy filing date. 
Airlines can use this model to deploy corrective measures to alter the firm’s underlying problems, 
redefine strategies, and avoid bankruptcy, while investors can use this model to avoid or reduce 
investments in questionable firms that cannot be salvaged.
Keywords: airline industry, Altman Z- Score model, bankruptcy prediction, multiple discriminant analysis, ratio analysis
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Introduction
Between 2001 and 2011, the U.S. airline business 
suffered $10  billion in losses (Neuman, 2011). 
The  industry in aggregate lost over $60  billion in 
the 32  years following deregulation in 1978. Leg-
acy airlines have had a particularly hard time. Since 
1998, 10 large North American airlines have filed for 
bankruptcy: Air Canada; American; ATA (Ameri-
can Trans Air); Delta; Frontier; Hawaiian; North-
west; TWA (Trans World Airlines); US Airways; 
and United. TWA is no longer operating; it flew its 
last official flight on December 1, 2001. ATA ceased 
operations in 2008. America West acquired US Air-
ways, which then merged with American Airlines; 
Continental merged with United; Northwest merged 
with Delta; Southwest acquired AirTran; and Alaska 
Airlines acquired Virgin America (Denning, 2011). 
By 2015, four mega- carriers made up a combined 
80% of all U.S. flights (Groden, 2015).
Warren Buffett, chairman of Berkshire Hathaway 
and probably one of the most successful investors in 
the world, called the airline industry a “death trap 
for investors” in 2013 (La Monica, 2017). What hap-
pened? Volatile fuel prices, overcapacity, the eco-
nomic recessions, terrorism, war, increased security 
costs, rising insurance premiums, high competi-
tion, and poor management have all contributed to 
the adverse financial impact on the airline industry 
(Federal Aviation Administration, 2014). The airline 
industry was officially deregulated in October 1978, 
which brought about many changes including the 
strengthening of hub and spoke operations, fare cut-
ting, and the entry of new competitors into the indus-
try. Before airline deregulation, no major airline filed 
for Chapter 11 bankruptcy (Cheng & McDonald, 
1996). Following deregulation, the airline industry 
has suffered financially from various problems: the 
economic recessions of the early 1980s and 2008– 
2013, rising jet fuel prices, rising labor costs, mainte-
nance and interest costs, foreign exchange risk, rising 
insurance costs, and intensified competition.
The transition from a regulated to a deregulated 
environment increased the instability of the carriers’ 
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operating profits. Total risk, defined as the volatility 
of net profits and cash flows over time, has increased 
dramatically in the airline industry. Oil prices have 
been, at times, over $100 per barrel. Consequently, 
jet fuel prices have skyrocketed, devastating the air-
lines’ bottom lines.
If there were a means of predicting the combi-
nations of characteristics of an airline that is likely 
to fail, corrective measures could be taken to alter 
the firm’s underlying problems as well as redefine 
strategies and procedures. This could also be use-
ful to investors by helping them avoid or reduce 
investments in questionable firms that cannot be 
salvaged (Patterson, 2001). One method of predict-
ing financial distress that has been widely used for 
nearly 50 years is the statistical bankruptcy predic-
tion model, first presented by Altman (1968). This 
model, the Altman Z- Score model, is a popular 
approach for not only forecasting bankruptcy in 
advance of the event but also gauging the overall 
financial condition of a firm.
The objective of this study is to analyze financially 
distressed and non- financially distressed airlines 
using a traditional bankruptcy prediction model, 
in order to evaluate its ability to predict bankruptcy 
in the airline industry. This study will add to bank-
ruptcy research, addressing Altman and Hotchkiss’s 
(2006) recommendations to enhance previous mod-
els by introducing an alternative statistical model 
that may better predict which airlines are likely to 
fail and which are not likely to fail. The new model’s 
classification rate is compared to the rate generated 
using the Altman Zʺ- Score model, a variant of the 
original Altman Z- Score model.
Literature Review
Numerous models for predicting bankruptcy 
have been proposed. This paper will first examine 
general- purpose models, focusing on the Altman 
Z- Score model. Next, an overview of bankruptcy 
prediction research in the hospitality industry is 
presented, followed by a focus on past work predict-
ing airline bankruptcy.
Common Bankruptcy Prediction Models
Numerous studies have used the Altman Z- Score 
(Z- Score) model and its variants to predict firm 
bankruptcies and financial distress for manufac-
turing firms. One method of predicting financial 
distress that has been widely used for over 50 years 
is the statistical bankruptcy prediction model, first 
presented by Altman (1968). The Altman Z- Score 
model uses five financial ratios to represent the ele-
ments that predict failure. These elements are liquid-
ity, cumulative profitability, productivity, solvency, 
and activity. Multiple discriminant analysis (MDA) 
is applied to the financial ratios to understand group 
differences and to predict the likelihood than an 
entity (individual or object) will belong to a particu-
lar class or group based on several metric variables 
(Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2009).
In response to requests for a measure to predict 
the likelihood of bankruptcy for non- manufacturing 
firms, Altman developed the Zʺ model (i.e., the 
“Z- prime- prime”), a four- variable multiple discrim-
inant model (Altman & Hotchkiss, 2006). The four 
financial ratios used in the Zʺ- Score model repre-
sent liquidity, cumulative profitability, productivity, 
and solvency.
The Altman Zʺ- Score model is shown below:
 Zʺ = 6.56X1 + 3.26X2 + 6.72X3 + 1.05X4 + έ (1)
where
X1 = working capital/total assets,
X2 = retained earnings/total assets,
X3 = earnings before interest and taxes/total 
assets,
X4 = book value of equity/book value of total 
liabilities,
έ = error term, and,
Zʺ = overall index.
While the newer Zʺ- Score model provides greater 
accuracy for non- manufacturing and emerging 
markets (non- U.S.) firms, Altman and Hotchkiss 
(2006) do suggest that further developing of bank-
ruptcy prediction models for specific industries 
would be desirable.
Bankruptcy Prediction Models for the Hospitality 
Industry
There have been few studies devoted to bankruptcy 
prediction in hospitality and travel. Gu and Gao 
106 C. KROEZE ET AL.
(2000) used an MDA model to predict bankruptcy 
for hospitality firms including restaurant, hotel, and 
casino firms. Their model used five variables (total 
liabilities to total assets, EBIT to current liabilities, 
gross profit margin, long- term debt to total assets, 
and sales to fixed assets). This model could correctly 
predict bankruptcy in 93% of the sample firms one 
year in advance of the actual bankruptcy. Gu (2002) 
focused on bankruptcy prediction in the restaurant 
industry using the same MDA methodology. His 
MDA model predicted bankruptcy in 92% of the 
sample firms one year in advance of the actual bank-
ruptcy. A limitation of these two studies was the 
short- term predictive ability of their MDA models. 
Both models predicted bankruptcy only one year in 
advance.
Kim and Gu (2006a) first developed a logistic 
regression (logit) model to improve the prediction 
accuracy over the traditional MDA model. In this 
instance, they developed the model for use in the 
restaurant industry and found that while both logit 
and MDA performed about the same, the underly-
ing soundness of the results was stronger when using 
logit. These models predicted restaurant bankruptcy 
approximately one year prior to the bankruptcy.
Kim and Gu (2006b) next revisited the logit 
approach to predict hospitality firm bankruptcy two 
years in advance. This logit model could correctly 
predict 91% of hospitality bankruptcies one year in 
advance of the actual event, and 84% of bankrupt-
cies two years in advance of the event. The sample 
in this study included hotel, restaurant, and gaming 
companies. This improved model was proposed to 
help provide an “early distant warning” to hospi-
tality industry operators to allow adequate time to 
correct deficiencies and head off the bankruptcy.
Youn and Gu (2010) used a combination of logis-
tic regression and an artificial neural networking 
(ANN) model to predict Korean lodging firm fail-
ures. The addition of the ANN process improved 
the accuracy of the prediction rate over using only 
logistic regression. However, the use of an ANN 
requires a great deal of interpretation of “black box” 
processes. The ANN approach also does not provide 
prescriptive results, which has the disadvantage of 
not providing actionable data for the firm to use to 
improve its areas of weak performance.
Kim (2011) compared four different methods— 
MDA, logit, ANN, and support vector machine 
(SVM) models— to determine which provided the 
greatest accuracy and which minimized the inci-
dences of Type 1 and Type 2 errors. The author con-
cluded that the ANN technique provided the best 
accuracy of the four models.
Airline Bankruptcy Prediction Models
Several different statistical techniques have been 
used in the past to assess airline financial perfor-
mance, including MDA, logit, and ANN.
MDA. The first approach, MDA, attempts to clas-
sify airlines as financially distressed or not distressed 
(Gritta, 1974; Gritta, 1982; Scaggs & Crawford, 1986; 
Gola szewski & Sanders, 1992; Chung & Szenberg, 
1996; Gritta, Adrangi, Adams, & Tatyanina, 2008). 
Gritta (1974) looked at “the significance of the effects 
of capitalization on the ‘perceived’ amounts of long- 
term debt in an airline firm’s capital structure, and 
therefore, on the debt- to- equity measures” (p. 47). 
Gritta (1982) applied a generally accepted model to 
air transportation in an effort to appraise air carriers’ 
financial strength and to predict likely bankruptcy 
candidates. The analysis was designed to aid in pin-
pointing the causes of the air carriers’ financial dif-
ficulties and was intended to be of interest to airline 
management, creditors, and regulators. Scaggs and 
Crawford (1986) revisited Altman’s bankruptcy model 
to determine if airline bankruptcy could be predicted. 
Their model predicted bankruptcy well but did not 
predict non- bankruptcy well.
Golaszewski and Sanders (1992) stated that their 
object was “not to predict bankruptcy performance 
per se; rather, it is to examine the status of a carri-
er’s finances prior to bankruptcy and then identify 
other carriers which, while not bankrupt, are under 
significant financial distress” (p. 313). Chung and 
Szenberg (1996) employed Altman’s Z- Score as a 
measure of the airline industry’s financial stability 
in the 1980s, following the industry’s deregulation. 
They identified increased volatility throughout the 
industry, classifying the industry’s “health” as either 
healthy or unhealthy. However, the authors did not 
use the model to predict bankruptcy.
Gritta et al. (2008) assessed the financial condi-
tion of the major U.S. air carriers from 2000 to 2006 
and compared their financial strength to the 1995– 
1999 period when the carriers earned record profits. 
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They found an increasing trend in negative equity 
and increased leverage, predicting future bankrupt-
cies if the low interest rates available from 2000– 
2006 were to rise.
Kroeze and Mayer (2006) developed a variant of 
the MDA approach and found improved predictive 
capabilities, and recommended retesting the model 
in the future to include a larger sample of com-
panies that had undergone either Chapter 7 or 11 
bankruptcy.
Logistic regression. Other researchers used a different 
approach by developing logistic regression (logit) 
models, which predict the odds- ratio of an event 
occurring. For example, Gudmundsson (1999; 2002) 
constructed a logistic regression model of airline 
distress prediction using three years of worldwide 
airline  data (1996– 1998) including non- financial 
operating data and proxy variables for governmental 
influence and quality of economic environment. The 
findings demonstrated a fairly good model,  having 
90.3% overall prediction accuracy. These findings, 
in conjunction with other research in this field, sup-
ported that models based on non- financial variables 
showed good prediction traits comparable to finan-
cial based models, yet provided more explanatory 
power.
Neural networks. Next, a few researchers have 
employed a neural network approach to predict air-
line bankruptcy. Davalos, Gritta, and Chow (1999) 
and Gritta, Wang, Davalos, and Chow (2000) devel-
oped airline bankruptcy prediction models using 
this approach. Studies were conducted on both 
major and regional air carriers using the neural net-
work. Twenty- one pieces of financial information 
from carrier balance sheets and income statements 
were entered into the model. The study successfully 
classified all the major carriers that filed for receiv-
ership and most of the regional carriers. The use of 
neural networks may provide an interesting supple-
ment to the analyst in appraising financial health.
Finally, some researchers are exploring bankruptcy 
from different perspectives. For example, Jayanti 
and Jayanti (2011) examined the effect of one airline 
company’s bankruptcy on its competitors, finding 
that when a major airline announces it is going into 
Chapter 11 restructuring, its competitors realize 
abnormally high returns, although these returns 
drop precipitously when the bankrupt carrier 
emerges from bankruptcy.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study is to test Altman’s Zʺ- Score 
model in the context of the airline industry, and then 
to compare it against a new, proposed model. It seeks 
to update and extend these earlier studies of airline 
bankruptcy prediction. The goals are to add to theory 
and practice by identifying a model that is easy to use 
(unlike ANN modeling), accurate, and one that pro-
vides the greatest advance notice of the risk of bank-
ruptcy proceedings. Such a model will help airline 
operators to take corrective action as soon as pos-
sible and help investors with decision- making. To do 
this, the study tests the following hypotheses:
H10: There is no relationship between the 
Altman Zʺ- Score model and the likelihood of 
bankruptcy for an airline firm.
H1A: There is a relationship between the 
Altman Zʺ- Score model and the likelihood of 
bankruptcy for an airline firm.
H20: The proposed bankruptcy prediction model 
is no better than the Altman Zʺ- Score model 
in predicting the likelihood of bankruptcy for 
an airline firm.
H2A: The proposed bankruptcy prediction model 
is better than the Altman Zʺ- Score model in 
predicting the likelihood of bankruptcy for an 
airline firm.
Methods
Altman (1968) stated that, ideally, one would like 
to develop a bankruptcy prediction model utilizing 
a homogeneous group of bankrupt companies and 
data as near to the present as possible. Following 
Altman’s guidelines, this study used bankrupt and 
non- bankrupt airline firms’ 1998– 2005 financial 
statements. The financial statements were retrieved 
from the Securities Exchange Commission’s EDGAR 
database (Securities Exchange Commission, 2018) 
and from airline firms’ annual reports, which are 
available online from the individual companies’ web-
sites. All publicly held U.S. companies are required 
to file their financial statements with the SEC.
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Bankrupt companies, for the purposes of this 
study, were defined as those meeting one of the fol-
lowing conditions: (1) in Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
protection; or, (2) in Chapter 7 liquidation. Thus, 
those airline firms that were in one or more of these 
states at any time during the 1998– 2005 period were 
considered to be bankrupt, leading to a dichotomous 
variable representing bankruptcy filing between 
1998 and 2005.
This study used a census approach rather than 
a random sample. Only major and national air-
lines were selected for this study. Major airlines, or 
majors, are a group of large, certified air carriers 
that have annual operating revenues over $1 billion. 
National airlines, or nationals, are a group of large, 
certified air carriers that have annual operating 
revenues of $100 million to $1 billion.
The financial data of publicly held major passenger 
airlines included Alaska, America West, American, 
Continental, Delta, Northwest, Southwest, TWA, 
United, and US Air. Air Canada was also included 
in this study, as it has sufficiently large revenues and 
used Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP) in preparing its financial statements, similar 
to publicly owned U.S. firms. Air Canada’s stock was 
traded on the American Stock Exchange. The pub-
licly owned national passenger airlines (not includ-
ing regional airlines) included AirTran (formerly 
ValuJet), ATA (formerly Amtran), Frontier, Hawai-
ian, and JetBlue. Non- passenger airlines (DHL, Fed-
eral Express, and United Parcel Service) were not 
included in this study.
During the period 1998– 2005, the following nine 
airline firms were liquidated or filed for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy protection: Air Canada, ATA, America 
West, Delta, Hawaiian, Northwest, TWA, United, 
and US Airways. During the same period, the fol-
lowing seven firms were not liquidated, nor did they 
file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection: Air Tran, 
Alaska, American, Continental, Frontier, JetBlue, 
and Southwest.
This study utilized a holdout sample to evaluate 
the model. Holdout samples are useful when the 
period of the model is different from the period of 
evaluation. With this technique of model evaluation, 
the in- sample data ends at a point in time, and the 
remaining data are held out as a non- overlapping 
period of evaluation. The holdout sample is used 
to compare the forecasting accuracy of models fit to 
past data (SAS Institute, 2017). The in- sample size of 
62 data points and the holdout sample size of 22 data 
points were adequate, given the statistical method 
chosen and the two classification groups (Hair et al., 
2009).
Analysis and Results
The data were analyzed using multiple discrimi-
nant analysis (MDA) to predict group membership 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2012). MDA is principally 
used to classify and to make predictions in situa-
tions where the criterion variable is in categori-
cal form (Hair et al., 2009), as was the case in this 
study (e.g., bankrupt versus non- bankrupt). A sig-
nificant difference between the two groups, bank-
rupt or non- bankrupt, implies that one can predict 
whether a firm will be bankrupt in one, two, or 
even three years, depending upon the score that 
the firm receives from the application of MDA. 
The predictors were a set of financial ratios that 
measured a firm’s liquidity, cumulative profitabil-
ity, productivity, solvency, and cash flow (Beaver, 
1966).
Assumptions of MDA
The key assumptions for deriving the discriminant 
function are multivariate normality of the inde-
pendent variable and equal covariances (Hair et al., 
2009). MDA is relatively robust to failures of nor-
mality if skewness, rather than outliers, causes the 
violation. Robustness is expected with 20 cases in 
the smallest group if there are only five or fewer pre-
dictors (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2012). Therefore, in 
this case, robustness to any failures in normality of 
the residuals should be expected.
Results
Altman’s Zʺ- Score model. Using the Altman Zʺ- Score 
model, a firm with a score under 1.1 is classified as 
bankrupt. A firm with a score over 2.6 is classified 
as non- bankrupt. A firm whose score is between 1.1 
and 2.6 is classified as belonging to the “grey area.” 
Using 1998– 2003 data, this model did an unsatis-
factory job of predicting airline bankruptcy. Overall 
accuracy was only 57.5% over the entire time period, 
which is little better than a coin toss.
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Alternate model. An alternate three- variable model 
for predicting airline firm bankruptcy was created, 
using 1998– 2003 data for an in- sample analysis. 
Of the financial ratios tested, it was found that only 
three variables were statistically significant as pre-
dictors and did not have a collinearity issue. Data 
from 2004– 2005 was used as a holdout sample and 
to verify the prediction accuracy of the original 
model.
The alternate model is as follows:
 Ya = 0.268X1 + 0.838X2 + 0.111X3 + έ (2)
where
X1 = working capital/total assets,
X2 = retained earnings/total assets,
X3 = book value of equity/total liabilities,
έ = error term, and,
Ya = overall index.
Using 1998– 2003 in- sample data, 82.5% of the 
bankrupt airline firms were correctly classified as 
bankrupt, and 73.9% of the non- bankrupt firms 
were correctly classified as non- bankrupt. Overall, 
the accuracy was 80.9%. This result represented a 
considerable improvement over the Zʺ- Score mod-
el’s 57.5%. The alternate model was then tested using 
the holdout sample of 2004– 2005 data. The model 
correctly predicted bankruptcy 93% of the time one 
year ahead of the event, 87% of the time two years 
ahead of the event, and 73% of the time for three 
years ahead. The prediction accuracy, using the 
holdout sample, was even better than that of the in- 
sample data. This implies that the alternate model 
could do a respectable job in predicting future 
bankruptcy and could be a useful management tool. 
Table  1 displays the number of years, in advance, 
that each airline received a bankruptcy classifica-
tion. A negative score indicates that the airline was 
classified as bankrupt.
The scores for each non- bankrupt airline during 
the model development and testing period are dis-
played in Table 2. A positive score indicates that the 
airline was classified as non- bankrupt, according 
to the alternate model. Please note that although 
American Airlines received negative scores for 
2004– 2005, it did not file for bankruptcy until 2011.
Testing the Alternate Model with Recent Data
The financial data for four mega- carriers and two 
large national carriers were entered into the model 
to test its robustness over time. Table 3 displays the 
2015 and 2016 scores using the most recent finan-
cial data available for American, Delta, Southwest, 
United, Alaska, and JetBlue. A positive score indi-
cates that the airline was classified as non- bankrupt, 
according to the alternate model.
Please note that American Airlines a received 
negative score in 2015. It had large net losses each 
year from 2009– 2013. It declared bankruptcy in 2011 
and merged with US Airways in 2013. Although 
the company turned a profit in 2014 and 2015, its 
retained earnings were still negative in 2015. This 
resulted in a negative alternate model score for 2015. 
Its retained earnings became positive in 2016, and it 
achieved a positive score.
Frontier has been owned by an affiliate of 
Indigo Partners, LLC, a private equity firm, since 
Table 1. Alternate Model Results for Bankrupt Firms
Airline Year 
Bankruptcy 
Declared
Number 
of Years in 
Advance that 
Bankruptcy 
Was Correctly 
Predicted
Score, Year 
Bankruptcy 
Was Declared
Score, One 
Year before 
Bankruptcy
Score, Two 
Years before 
Bankruptcy
Score, Three 
Years before 
Bankruptcy
Score, Four 
Years before 
Bankruptcy
Air Canada 2003 4 − 0.07 − 0.45 − 0.03 − 0.09 − 0.08
America West 2005 3 − 0.01 − 0.01 − 0.05 − 0.12 0.05
ATA 2004 2 − 1.3 − 0.16 − 0.16 0.02 0.05
Delta 2005 2 − 0.43 − 0.23 − 0.07 0.03 0.09
Hawaiian 2003 4 − 0.36 − 0.5 − 0.2 − 0.27 − 0.08
Northwest 2005 4 − 0.37 − 0.16 − 0.08 − 0.11 − 0.04
TWA 2001 3 − 0.6 − 0.5 − 0.41 − 0.2 N.A.
United 2002 1 − 0.14 − 0.02 0.08 0.09 0.03
US Airways 2004 4 − 0.05 − 0.03 − 0.67 − 0.39 − 0.09
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December 2, 2013 (Drum, 2013); its financial state-
ments are no longer publicly available. Frontier has 
a small market share, less than 3% (Bureau of Trans-
portation Statistics, 2017). Air Canada is now ACE 
Aviation. The company’s financial statements are no 
longer available on the Securities Exchange Com-
mission’s website and the stock is no longer publicly 
available for sale in the United States. Therefore, 
Air Canada and Frontier no longer meet the study’s 
requirements and have been dropped from the 
analysis.
Chi-Square Analysis and Hypothesis Testing
Next, the two models were tested for statistical sig-
nificance. The data results were tested using chi- 
square analysis to see how unlikely the observed 
value is if the null hypothesis is true. The chi- square 
test’s assumptions are: 1) the categories of a variable 
do not overlap; 2) most of the expected counts must 
be greater than five; and 3) none of the expected 
counts can be fewer than one. These assumptions 
were met.
First, the Altman Zʺ- Score model was tested to 
determine if it classified the companies’ bankruptcy 
status better than a naïve prediction. Hypothe-
sis H10 states that there is no relationship between 
the Altman Zʺ- Score model and the likelihood 
of bankruptcy for an airline firm. The critical chi- 
square value (p<0.05, df 1) was not met. The Altman 
Zʺ- Score model failed, and hypothesis H10 is not 
rejected. There is no relationship between the Alt-
man Zʺ- Score and the likelihood of bankruptcy for 
an airline firm, therefore the alternate hypothesis is 
rejected.
Next, the alternate model was tested. The second 
hypothesis states that a revised bankruptcy predic-
tion model is no better than the Altman Zʺ- Score 
model in predicting the likelihood of bankruptcy 
for an airline firm. The critical chi- square value of 
7.87944 was achieved (p<0.005, df 1), thus rejecting 
H20. Therefore, the alternate hypothesis is accepted, 
since the alternate model is better than the Altman 
Zʺ- Score model in predicting the likelihood of 
bankruptcy for an airline firm.
Key Variables
The alternate model calculates a score, which, if neg-
ative, indicates a classification of bankruptcy and, if 
positive, the classification is non- bankruptcy. In the 
alternate model, the most important predictor of 
bankruptcy is the variable that represents retained 
earnings divided by total assets. This variable cor-
responds with the largest coefficient, 0.838, making 
it the most important predictor of bankruptcy. It 
makes intuitive sense that negative retained earnings 
would spell financial distress for an airline. A firm 
cannot sustain net losses for an extended amount of 
time without failing.
As shown in Table 1, the alternate model predicted 
that Air Canada, Hawaiian, Northwest, and US Air-
ways would go bankrupt four years in advance, that 
America West and TWA would go bankrupt three 
years before they did, that Delta and ATA would go 
bankrupt two years prior to the actual event, and 
that United would go bankrupt one year prior to 
its actual bankruptcy filing. These results constitute 
good prediction accuracy for up to four years before 
the actual event occurs.
Discussion
The transportation industry is critical to the 
economy to the United States. Hospitality and tour-
ism, for example, rely on the movement of con-
sumers as a crucial part of their business. Reliable, 
affordable air transport allows people to conduct 
Table 2. Alternate Model Results for Non- Bankrupt Firms
Airline Score, 2005 Score, 2004
Air Tran 0.14 0.30
Alaska 0.20 0.20
American − 0.04 − 0.01
Continental 0.07 0.06
Frontier 0.20 0.23
JetBlue 0.06 0.09
Southwest 0.42 0.44
Table 3. Recent Alternate Model Results for the Largest 
Remaining Airlines
Airline Score, 2016 Score, 2015
Alaska 0.33 0.43
American 0.02 −0.03
Delta 0.12 0.07
Hawaiian 0.16 0.24
JetBlue 0.28 0.20
Southwest 0.20 0.23
United 0.06 0.09
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business effectively and enjoy leisure activities away 
from home. The airline industry employs millions 
of people, directly and indirectly. There are many 
stakeholders in the future of the airline industry 
including travelers, employees, and investors.
Some airlines have responded to their financial 
troubles by merging. America West acquired US 
Airways, which then merged with American Air-
lines; Continental merged with United; Northwest 
merged with Delta; Southwest acquired AirTran; 
and Alaska Airlines acquired Virgin America (Den-
ning, 2011). By 2015, four mega- carriers made up 
a combined 80% of all U.S. flights (Groden, 2015). 
The industry’s financial health has improved to the 
point where, in 2016, Warren Buffett (who called 
the  airline industry a financial investment death 
trap in 2013) invested in the four mega- carriers: 
American, United, Delta, and Southwest (La Mon-
ica, 2017).
There is also a not- so- subtle irony about bank-
ruptcy: it costs money. And the bigger the company, 
the more it costs. Filing for Chapter 11 cost AMR 
hundreds of millions of dollars in attorney and other 
professional fees. There is also the stigma that is 
attached to bankruptcy. Nobody wants to work for 
a bankrupt company, and few CEOs want to be in 
charge of a bankrupt company (Neuman, 2011).
This study tested two corporate bankruptcy pre-
diction models. The Altman Zʺ- Score model was 
tested for its capacity to predict airline firm bank-
ruptcy, using financial statements from the period 
1998– 2003. A new model was created, using three 
of the four Altman Zʺ- Score model’s predictor vari-
ables. Both of these models were compared against 
the results of a naïve prediction.
The three financial ratios used in the new model 
represent liquidity, cumulative profitability, and sol-
vency. According to Schmidgall (2011), liquidity 
ratios reveal the ability of a firm to meet its current 
obligations. This study uses the working capital/total 
assets ratio, which is particularly useful for analyzing 
airline companies because they are capital- intensive 
and service significant amounts of debt, requiring 
liquidity to meet these obligations.
Cumulative profitability (Retained Earnings/
Total Assets) indicates profits a company earns on 
its assets over time. According to Altman (1968), the 
age of a firm is implicitly incorporated in this ratio. 
The younger the firm is, the lower the ratio will be. 
On the other hand, since airline companies own 
very substantial assets, even a relatively low value 
may represent sizable profits.
Solvency ratios measure a firm’s capability to meet 
long- term debt (Schmidgall, 2011). This study uses 
a solvency ratio that compares the firm’s total equity 
to its total liabilities. This financial metric measures 
a firm’s ability to withstand adversity.
The Altman Zʺ- Score model performed no bet-
ter than a naïve prediction in predicting airline firm 
bankruptcy. The new three- variable model, however, 
could predict airline firm bankruptcy up to four 
years before the actual event. The alternate  model 
not only performed better than the Zʺ- Score model 
but also was simpler, since it used fewer variables. 
Further, it predicted membership in one of only 
two groups (rather than three under the Zʺ- Score 
model), and used a single score (of zero) as a cut- off 
to distinguish whether a firm belonged to the bank-
rupt group or the non- bankrupt group. Therefore, 
the alternate model emerges as a more sophisticated 
and practical model at the same time, having major 
implications as a bankruptcy alert tool for the air-
line industry and any other industry that wishes to 
adapt  it. Furthermore, this study responds to Alt-
man and Hotchkiss’s (2006) suggestion that there is 
a need for further development of bankruptcy pre-
diction models for specific industries.
Limitations of the Study and Suggestions for 
Future Research
There are several limitations to this study. First, this 
analysis is limited by the availability of financial 
data on airlines. Only publicly traded corporations 
are required to make their financial statements available 
to everyone, via filings with the Securities Exchange 
Commission. Therefore, only publicly traded airlines 
were part of this study. The data used in this study 
was limited to financial statements that are available 
in filings with the SEC; the relatively small number of 
publicly traded airlines does not permit examination 
of a larger sample size.
A second limitation is the variation in operating 
models among the sample’s airlines. For example, 
some airlines lease their jets, which are the most 
important assets for an airline. Other airlines pur-
chase their jets, using long- term debt financing. 
This lease versus ownership difference may have an 
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impact on the presentation of an airline’s balance 
sheet accounts.
A third limitation is the use of ratio analysis. 
Ratios are extremely useful to owners, creditors, and 
management in evaluating the financial condition 
of airlines, and appear to work well to help predict 
bankruptcy up to four years ahead of the event. 
Ratios, however, are only indicators. They do not 
reveal a problem’s source, just indicate that there may 
be a problem (Beaver, 1966). Future models should 
develop a solution to not only detect a problem but 
also pinpoint the source of the problem to permit 
companies to take corrective action. For example, a 
future study could use ratios and overlay trend data 
on other influencers, such as jet fuel costs or “black 
swan” events that strongly affect airline travel (e.g., 
pandemic outbreaks or major volcanic eruptions). 
Future studies could also use this study’s model to 
predict bankruptcy in other types of businesses.
In summary, this study has shown that financial 
ratios can be used to predict airline firm bankruptcy. 
The accuracy of a traditional model was tested. The 
traditional model did not predict airline firm bank-
ruptcy accurately. A new, simpler alternate model 
was developed, which could predict airline firm 
bankruptcy up to four years ahead of the actual event.
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